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Doctor Elçin Macar, Turkish historian and Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Istanbul’s Yıldız Technical University, recently spent five months as a guest of Hellenic College/Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology in Brookline, Massachusetts with his wife, Dr. Oya Macar, as they researched American Protestant missionary activity in 19th- and 20th-century Turkey. Dr. Macar is a frequent visitor to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, a relationship that began with his doctoral dissertation on 20th-century relations between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Turkish Republic. An advocate for Turkish minorities and minority rights, Dr. Macar spent several evenings in the spring of 2012 with Road to Emmaus detailing the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s historic tensions and contemporary relations with the Turkish state. In this fresh view of a troubled era, he speaks openly about the needs of the Greek Orthodox community and other Christian minorities, and introduces us to a generation of Turkish, Greek, and Balkan historians who are collaborating on candid and rigorous reappraisals of their common history.

RTE: Professor Macar, we were extremely interested to discover your work on the historical and continuing relationship between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Republic of Turkey. As an independent Turkish historian and Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Istanbul’s Yıldız Technical University, how do you approach such a complex subject?

DR. MACAR: I do not believe that a nation-based or a religious-based historiography can explain history well. For example, there are large gaps in Greek

*Opposite: Church of St. George through the gate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.*
historiography between the Byzantine Empire and modern Greece. This period is often just referred to as the Tourkokratia, the “rule of the Turks,” and is generally thought of as “dark centuries,” with some colorful legends like secret schools. This may be all that most people know, but if we want to go deeper to find the Greek contribution to the structure of the Ottoman Empire and what church-state relations were like, we can’t learn this from Greek historiography. Likewise, we can’t learn from Turkish historiography about the history of Asia Minor before the coming of the Turks or how the non-Muslim communities actually lived in the Ottoman Empire. In opposition to the Greek view of the “darkness of the Tourkokratia,” Turkish historians often describe the Ottoman Empire as “fair, tolerant and benevolent,” which is why we need a new, wide ranging, supranational, territory-based study of history.

My own approach is not from a nationalist political perspective, but from within the framework of human rights. In this I feel myself close to political scientists and historians like Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm, who view nationhood as a new entity, at the most two hundred years old, and as a product of capitalism rather than of race.

RTE: As an introduction for our readers, the population of the Ottoman Empire was ruled through a series of millets that were based on religious belief. The four major religious communities—Muslim, Greek Orthodox, Armenian and Jewish—each ruled their own co-religionists and maintained separate law courts, subject to the sultan. The Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople exercised an ecumenical role as the supreme ecclesiastical and civil authority over the Christian millet, which included the Ottoman Empire’s Orthodox Greeks, Bulgarians, Albanians, Vlachs, Macedonian Slavs, Georgians, Arabs, Romanians and Serbs, despite their differences in ethnicity and language. How did this change in 1923 when the empire fell and Turkey was declared a republic?

DR. MACAR: I would say that changes affecting the millets first began in the 19th century under the Ottomans. In the 20th century, under the leader-
ship of Ataturk, the new Turkish state at first aimed to create a new national identity by eradicating religious identities altogether. However, its project to “create equal citizens within the framework of secularism,” along the lines of the French Revolution, did not succeed because the common denominator for Balkan nationalism has been to define the nation in terms of religion. There was simply no place for non-Muslims in the nation-state building process of the new republic; the “future Turk” could rise only on the foundation of Islam. The natural consequence of this was that Muslims were regarded as “eligible citizens” and non-Muslims as “unwanted citizens.” The new state defined its official minorities in terms of religion and labeled them “non-Muslims” despite this contradiction to its secular claims. Within this framework, minorities, including the most important institution of the Greek Orthodox community, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, faced a variety of difficulties. For instance, just after the signing of the Lausanne Treaty, the governor of Istanbul sent a memorandum to the patriarchate on October 6, 1923 stating that in order to participate in any religious or spiritual election in Turkey, a candidate for patriarch must be a citizen of Turkey and that he should be on duty in Turkey during the election process. This policy would be in practice from then on for all patriarchal elections.

The Secular Republic and Patriarchal Authority

RTE: How did the new secular republic regard the patriarch’s authority?

DR. MACAR: During the 1920’s the government would only title the person in charge of the Ecumenical Throne, “chief priest”, but not “patriarch”. Probably there were two purposes in that. They wanted to eradicate any reminder of the patriarchate’s former ecumenical character and put to rest the patriarch’s earthly authority as “ethnarch” from Ottoman times. As soon as the caliphate was abolished in 1924, the secular Turkish press began to debate the expulsion of the patriarchate, asking, “If the government has already expelled the caliphate from the borders of Turkey, why not do the same with the patriarchate?”

1 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938): Ottoman Turkish officer and the first president of Turkey (1923-1938), who is credited as the founder of the Republic of Turkey. After establishing a provisional government and retaking land ceded to Greece after Turkey’s defeat in World War I, he gained military independence and embarked upon a program of political, economic, and cultural reform to transform the former Ottoman Empire into a westernized secular nation-state. Ataturk’s reforms, upon which modern Turkey was established, are referred to as Kemalism.
RTE: For those who may not be familiar with the debate over the expulsion of the patriarchate, at the time of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, a separate convention was signed mandating a compulsory exchange of populations, in which 400,000 Muslims whose families had been in Greece for centuries were “expatriated” from Greece to Turkey, and over a million Greek Orthodox Christians, some of whom only spoke a Greek-Turkish dialect and whose forebears had lived in Asia Minor since before the time of Christ, were moved to Greece. A small minority of Muslims were allowed to stay in the region of Thrace in northeastern Greece, while the Patriarch of Constantinople and the local Greek Orthodox community of 100,000 people were allowed to remain in Constantinople/Istanbul and on the two small islands of Imbros and Tenedos at the mouth of the Dardanelles. Smaller groups of Roman Catholics, Protestants, Armenian Christians and Jews stayed as well. During this same period of 1922-24, the secular Republic of Turkey was also established, replacing the Ottoman sultanate.

As you said, a burning question in the new republic was, “If the caliphate has been expelled, why not the patriarchate?” Before we answer that, Professor Macar, can you remind us what authority the caliph actually had, and how that differed from the authority of the sultan?

DR. MACAR: The caliph was the religious leader of all of the Muslims of the world, both a temporal and religious leader. The first caliphs were successors of the Prophet Muhammed, but after 1517, Ottoman sultans claimed the caliphate from the Egyptian Mamluks, and both civil and religious power became embodied in the person of the Ottoman sultan. The sultanate was abolished in 1922, when the title of sultan and caliph were separated, and the caliphate was abolished eighteen months later, when Abdulmecid, the last sultan-caliph, was exiled.

RTE: Then abolishing the caliphate would have been the equivalent of abolishing the papacy or the patriarchate?

DR. MACAR: Exactly.

RTE: So, the Turkish Republic exiled their own Muslim sultan-caliph, but they left the Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul?
DR. MACAR: Not only the patriarch. They also left the Jewish Grand Rabbi, the Armenian Patriarch and an archbishop in charge of the Roman Catholics.

RTE: Why on earth would they have spared the non-Muslim leaders, particularly if non-Muslims were effectually second-class citizens?

DR. MACAR: It’s a little complicated. When the Turkish Republic was established in 1923, there was both a secular president and a religious caliph. Because, as I said, in Islam you cannot separate religious leadership and political leadership, and the caliphate could not be incorporated into the new secular Turkey, it was abolished. This was gladly accepted by the West, particularly by Britain, because she had millions of Muslims in her colonies in India and elsewhere, and she did not want a caliph who might encourage pan-Islamic rebellion. Also, by this time, the caliphate had lost most of its wider political influence—for example in World War I, the Arabs refused the sultan-caliph’s call for a holy war against the Ottoman Empire’s enemies, because they had already allied themselves with the British to throw off Ottoman rule. Here, Muslim Arabs had struggled against their Muslim caliph.

The question as to why Turkey didn’t abolish the patriarchate and other religious institutions at the same time has been discussed ever since. When the Turkish government first stated that it wanted the patriarchate to leave Turkey, there was great resistance to the idea by the Lausanne Treaty negotiators. The government finally agreed that the patriarchate could stay, although it was stripped of its temporal political power as head of the Christian millet and became solely the religious authority it is today. Ataturk made some speeches against the patriarchate, but I believe that he didn’t do anything more against non-Muslim religious institutions because he needed international support and did not want to break off relations with these European countries.

RTE: How did the 1923 population exchange agreement affect the patriarchate?
DR. MACAR: Within the current borders of Turkey, the exchange caused the complete depopulation of eleven Orthodox metropolitanates in Thrace and twenty-six in Asia Minor, with a total decline of 90% of the Christian population. Losing its properties in these areas made the patriarchate dependent on financial support from Greece and from the Greek diaspora. In 1917, 400,000 of the 1,350,000 people living in and around Istanbul were ethnic Greeks; by 1927, that figure had declined to 100,124.

The population exchange agreement was also a problem for the patriarch personally. The status of Patriarch Konstantine VI, who was elected in late 1924, was controversial because of a clause of the agreement by which only Greeks who had established residency in Istanbul before the armistice of 1918 were allowed to stay. Because he did not fulfill this residency requirement, the patriarch was deported by order of the government in 1925. His defense was that he had been on the staff of the patriarchate, but assigned outside the borders of Istanbul since 1918. This was not allowed, however, and the crisis was resolved by the patriarch’s resignation. In return, other members of the Holy Synod with questionable residency status were exempted from the exchange. When the Kemalist reforms of the single-party period of 1923-1945 expelled religion and religious institutions from Turkey’s public life, the patriarchate silently accepted the new conditions while continuing its ministry to the Greek population.

The Cold War Era: Republican Turkey and the Patriarchate

RTE: Did World War II and the Cold War have ramifications on Turkish-Patriarchate relations? Turkey, after all, was on the border of Soviet Georgia and Armenia.

DR. MACAR: Yes it did. After World War II, during the first stages of the Cold War, Stalin expected the Moscow Patriarchate to exercise influence on the other Orthodox patriarchates, just as the USSR would later expect it to represent Soviet interests in such organizations as the World Council of Churches. Seeing this, the United States realized that the Ecumenical Patriarchate could also be an organ for international relations. In 1948, Archbishop Athenagoras of North and South America was elected as the new Ecumenical Patriarch in absentia and later made a citizen of Turkey. This was a typical Cold War era operation. Years later, Athenagoras would tell the New York Herald Tribune that he represented the religious part of the Tru-
man Doctrine. In Chicago, before his departure for Turkey, Athenagoras told reporters that in the first days of World War II, Roosevelt had stated that the U.S. borders reached to France, but now the defensive borders of the U.S. extended to Kars. Kars, of course, was a Turkish city bordering the USSR.

RTE: Yes. It’s still warmly remembered in the Greek-American community that President Truman flew Archbishop Athenagoras to Istanbul for his enthronement as patriarch in the presidential plane, the equivalent of Air Force One. Most of us are aware that the American separation of church and state still allows for the cultivation of politically useful relationships, and although the state does not involve itself in internal religious issues, the U.S. government is as interested in the Ecumenical Patriarchate as it is in the Vatican and in the Chief Rabbinate of Israel.

Having said that, I think we have to be careful not to characterize Patriarch Athenagoras as only a spokesman for western values. As Constantinople’s chief hierarch, he had to find Christian answers to his era’s thorny complexities, and they often took unexpected turns. For instance, during the Sovi-

2 “In 1938 Athenagoras became an American citizen. During the eighteen years of his episcopate in America [1930-1948], he became close friends with Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, and both regarded him as an authoritative spokesman for the Greek community.... On 1 November 1948, the Holy Synod elected him to the office of Ecumenical Patriarch. He arrived in Istanbul on 26 January 1949, after exchanging his American for Turkish citizenship. His predecessor, Maximos V, had abdicated under ambiguous circumstances. It was widely felt that Athenagoras owed his election to U.S. influence, and significantly he travelled to Turkey in President Truman’s private plane. This was the period of the Cold War. American foreign policy aimed at an alliance between Greece and Turkey, so as to contain Stalin’s thrust into the Balkans, and Athenagoras seemed the man best qualified to produce a Greco-Turkish rapprochement. At the same time Athenagoras had the reputation of being an outspoken anti-Communist, and the Americans hoped that he would counter-balance the growing influence of the Moscow Patriarchate within the Orthodox Church....

"During his twenty-four years on the Ecumenical Throne, Patriarch Athenagoras was guided always by three major objectives: good relations with the Turkish government, inter-Orthodox co-operation, and Christian unity. With the first of these objectives in view, he did everything humanly possible to underline the exclusively religious character of the Patriarchate. At the cost of offending chauvinist opinion in Greece, he dissociated himself completely from the mentality of the "Great Idea", from the dream of a restored Byzantine Empire in the shores of the Bosphorus: 'I am a Turk', he insisted. Above his chair, as he spoke with visitors, there hung an imposing portrait of Ataturk. But this Turkophile policy met eventually with almost complete failure.... By the time of his death, the outward condition of the Patriarchate in Turkey was worse than it had ever been since the 15th century. But for all this Athenagoras himself was in no way to blame. The cause lay outside his control—in Cyprus.” (Kallistos Ware, “The Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras I,” Eastern Churches Review, Vol. IV, No. 1, Spring 1972, pgs. 157-159.)

3 Ed. note: Regarding continuing U.S. government interest in world religious centers, the June 2011 issue of State Magazine, the monthly publication of the U.S. State Department, describes U.S. embassy work in Vatican City: "...A network of more than 400,000 priests, 750,000 nuns, 75,000 monks and millions of lay volunteers around the world provides information to the Vatican. This immense network makes Vatican City a well-known 'listening post' where the United States can gain new international insights. In many ways, Embassy Vatican is a bilateral post with a multilateral agenda." (J. Bland, J, Degory, A. Agnone, “Holy See”, State Magazine, Washington D.C., June 2011, pg. 24-30.)

*Opposite: Archbishop Athenagoras greeting US President Harry Truman, 1947.*
et era, when the Moscow Patriarchate was under great pressure, he never doubted the essential unity of the Church and continued to invite the collaboration of Moscow hierarchs in pan-Orthodox deliberations. In a conversation with the French Orthodox theologian Oliver Clement, the patriarch remarked: “It is false to reduce the situation of Orthodoxy to the duality of Constantinople and Moscow.... I am trying to act as one who serves, and who serves solely with the power of love. Love knows no dualities.”

Dr. Macar, can you describe how things developed for the Orthodox community in Constantinople after the patriarch’s enthronement?

DR. MACAR: Yes. The first years of Athenagoras’ rule could be considered as a golden period for the patriarchate under Republican Turkey. In 1952, the Theophany ceremony, in which a cross is thrown into the water and recovered by swimmers to celebrate the baptism of Jesus Christ, was held publicly and attended by Istanbul’s vested Orthodox clerics for the first time in the Republican period. During those years, the patriarch was also able to obtain Turkish citizenship for some clergy, thanks to his good relations with Prime Minister Menderes.

But certainly all was not peaceful at this time. September of 1955 saw the two-day period in which Greek stores, homes, churches, and cemeteries were attacked and vandalized, partly because Cyprus had become an issue of great difficulty for Turkish-Greek relations. The 1960’s continued to be crisis years, and during this period the Turkish government cancelled the 1930 treaty on Settlement, Trade and Navigation that had been signed by Ataturk and Venizelos, the Turkish president and Greek prime minister. Also during this time, 12,000 Greek citizens were deported from Constantinople/Istanbul and 28,000 Turkish citizens of Greek descent also left because they were married to, or children of, the deportees. Altogether, about 40,000 members of the patriarchate’s community moved to Greece.

Also at this time sanctions were instituted against the patriarchate. In 1964, the patriarchal printing house was shut down; the government claiming that its activity was in violation of the Lausanne Treaty. This ended the publication of the patriarchate’s two major periodicals: Apostolos Andreas


6 With the exception of the ecclesiastical leader of recognized religious groups, such as the Ecumenical Patriarch or the Chief Rabbi, clerical garb cannot be worn publicly by clergy of any religion in the secular Republic of Turkey; thus Theophany of 1952 was an exceptional occasion.
and Orthodoksia, and was followed by a government ban on publishing any books or encyclopedias in Greek. These sanctions also prohibited prayers and the celebration of religious holidays in Greek schools, Orthodox clerics were no longer permitted to enter Greek schools, and graduates of Halki Seminary, whether ordained or not, were banned from teaching in Greek schools. In 1964, the patriarchate’s sixty-year-old orphanage on the island of Prinkipo (Büyükada) was also closed.

RTE: All of this must have been devastating for the Greek community, particularly after the attacks of September 6-7, 1955. Sixty out of the city’s eighty churches were gutted or sacked, and the damage to businesses and property was close to £50,000,000.7

DR. MACAR: Yes. We also have to remember that although Greek-Turkish relations were extremely difficult, the sanctions of 1964 not only targeted Greek Christians: Protestant, Catholic, Muslim and Jewish schools came under the same bans. The goal of the government was to create a purely secular state, so all religious symbolism, teaching, and prayer was banished from public and private schools. This had been formally decreed as early as 1924 and 1925 when the new republic had removed the crosses from private Christian schools as well as religious symbols from Muslim and Jewish schools. Before 1964, the Turkish administration had informally turned a blind eye to praying in schools, but now the law was to be enforced.

In 1965, the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a statement: “Turkish-Greek relations depend on the balance founded in the Lausanne Treaty. The Cyprus issue, Dodecanesian Turks, Greeks in Istanbul and the Patriarchate are to be considered in terms of comparative reciprocity.” This was a new interpretation of the Lausanne Treaty that had never been intended. The Lausanne Treaty had upheld the rights of the Turkish minority who were allowed to stay in northeastern Greece, and the rights of the Greek minority in Istanbul and a few small islands, but now the Turkish government was saying, “Any unfair treatment of Turks in western Thrace (Greece) will be an occasion for reciprocal treatment against the Greek community and patriarchate in Istanbul.” This was a contradiction because, although Turkey has always rejected suggestions from other nations concerning the patriarchate by reminding them that the patriarchate is a “Turkish institution” and a matter of “internal

concern,” in practice, it treated the patriarchate as a “Greek institution” and sometimes explicitly described it as a “trump card.” If it was an internal matter, how could it be a trump card against foreigners? How could a Turkish institution be within the framework of the “reciprocity principle”?

RTE: So, from a human rights perspective, Turkey was holding its own citizens hostage as a deterrent against the mistreatment of Greek citizens of Turkish descent by Greece?

DR. MACAR: Yes, exactly. This is a “Balkan illness.” Now, after the reciprocity statement, tensions continued to build. When Patriarch Athenagoras died in 1972, the most likely candidate for patriarch was Meliton (Hatzis), the Metropolitan of Chalcedon, but the Turkish government vetoed him and four other candidates. Under those circumstances, Demetrios, who had been Metropolitan of Imbros and Tenedos for less than six months, was elected patriarch.

RTE: What motivated these tensions?

DR. MACAR: There were two essential reasons for these tensions during Turkey’s Republican period, when the government kept a distance from all religious institutions and particularly from the patriarchate. The first was the republic’s desire to uproot the Ottoman legacy, which had some basis in history. In the late 19th- and early 20th-century Ottoman period, the Great Powers—Britain, France, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Russia—each wanted to use the patriarchate, which still ruled over the Christian millet, as a political organ to further their national interests. These countries were afraid that if they did not retain their influence with the patriarchate, another country would step in, so each continually pressured the Ottoman government to make decisions in favor of the patriarchate. Naturally, in the mind of Republican statesmen, the patriarchate had become a tool of the Great Powers.

In 1918, when the Great Powers occupied the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, Venizelos came to power as the Greek prime minister after the exile of King Constantine I and he exerted his own pressure on the patriarchate, causing patriarchal officials (as well as Greek churches around the


Opposite: Patriarchate of Constantinople, the Phanar.
world) to split into two groups—the Venizelists and the Royalists. The Royalists feared Venizelos and his possible actions against Turkey, and from archival documents we know that some of these Royalists considered themselves pro-Ottoman. It was a realistic response because they reasoned, “This Greek occupation army will leave tomorrow—but we will still be here with the Ottomans.” Venizelos then pressured the patriarchate to elect a new patriarch, also from America, Meletius IV (Metaxakis) (1921-1923), who was pro-Venizelos. In Turkey, the newly enthroned patriarch both blessed and collected money for the Greek occupation army. The Turks were aware of his actions and after the defeat of the Greek army, they said, “This patriarch must go.”

The second reason for the tension with the patriarchate during the republican period is the “enemy inside” rationale, which ran: “Although the patriarchate is subject to Turkish law, because of its common Orthodoxy, Greek language and Byzantine culture, the Ecumenical Patriarchate will always have Greek interests at heart, including Greece’s ambitions to regain territory in Asia Minor.” This rationale was brought up in the mid-1950’s, and employed to wear down the patriarchate. That is also why Turkey has never given the patriarchate legal status and anticipates that eventually it will just disappear as the population diminishes.

Late Twentieth-Century Political and Ecclesiastical Shifts

RTE: Has anything changed for the patriarchate since the Patriarch Athenagoras years?

DR. MACAR: Yes, the first major shift came in 1984, when former U.S. President Carter mediated the reconstruction of the main Ecumenical Patriarchate building that had burnt down in 1941, by obtaining a special permit from Prime Minister Turgut Özal. Expenses were paid by the Greek industrialist Panayiotis Angelopoulos and the new building, which contains offices and reception rooms, opened with great ceremony in 1989.

RTE: Why would a former U.S. president have mediated the permit for the patriarchate’s reconstruction? Did Carter have a personal relationship with the patriarch?

DR. MACAR: I believe that Archbishop Iakovos of North and South America asked former President Carter to help, and Carter was willing. But America
also saw the Ecumenical Patriarchate as a potential center of western values against communism and the Eastern Orthodox churches that were under communism.

This foresight on the American side proved correct, because when the Eastern Bloc collapsed in 1989 and people began to return to religion again, national Orthodox churches re-emerged as institutions with political power and a voice, often aligned with their newly independent governments. This caused a new interest in the Ecumenical Patriarchate by the United States, who didn’t want these churches to become nationalist. The hope was that, influenced and supported by the U.S., the Ecumenical Patriarchate might become a spiritual center for the Orthodox populations (with their attendant markets) in the Caucuses and Balkans. Since the 1990’s the Vatican has instituted a similar unifying policy in the Balkans by reclaiming properties confiscated by the former Communist regimes and proselytizing the descendants of Uniate Catholics who were under the Russian Orthodox Church during the Communist period.

The Vatican and the Ecumenical Patriarchate both defend western values—the free market, individual rights, religious freedom, political freedom, etc. As a transnational institution, the patriarchate has real influence, and it was around this time that U.S. foreign policy began referring to the patriarch as the “Orthodox pope.” Patriarch Demetrios’ visit to the United States in 1990 was an historic milestone—the first time that an Ecumenical Patriarch visited the U.S., and this made Orthodoxy much more visible.

RTE: We also saw His All Holiness Patriarch Bartholomew referred to as the “Orthodox pope” in the 60 Minutes episode of 2011. Although inaccurate, it isn’t surprising that the term would be used for a western audience unfamiliar with Orthodoxy. How had Turkey’s political climate altered by the time His All Holiness was elected in 1991? With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the decisive victory in the Gulf War, U.S. influence was then at its apex.

DR. MACAR: Patriarch Bartholomew, formerly the Metropolitan of Chalcedon, was elected because of his charisma, his ability to speak several languages and his broad knowledge of culture and diplomacy. This time, however, the election was free, and none of the candidates were removed from the list. The U.S. demanded this free election, and the Turkish President Ozal personally ordered that all eligible candidates remain on the list, in opposition to a longstanding policy that the government could remove names that it didn’t want.
RTE: That policy is very similar to the election of the Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, which can be vetoed by the governments of Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority; all three states must approve the election.

Dr. Macar, you make a compelling case for political and economic interests in this international focus on the Ecumenical Patriarchate and other religious centers, but isn’t there also a simpler motive involved; that the predominantly Christian West would like to see minority Christian rights respected in other countries?

DR. MACAR: Certainly, there are some powerful groups, such as non-governmental organizations that lobby in Western countries for world-wide human rights, but I do not see that, nor would I expect it, from governments. For example, there hasn’t been any opposition to the Saudi regime.

RTE: True. To pick up the historical thread, will you describe how the ecumenical character of the Patriarchate of Constantinople was expressed in Ottoman and Republican Turkey, and how you see its expression now?

DR. MACAR: Historically, the hierarch in charge of the Patriarchate of Constantinople has used the title “Patriarch” since the reign of Patriarch Akakios (471-489), and the title “Ecumenical Patriarch” since that of Patriarch Ioannis II (518-520). Throughout the Ottoman period, the patriarchate maintained its historical ecumenical function by encompassing diverse lingual and ethnic groups and by acting as the religious and secular head of the Christian millet under the sultan. This changed, however, when autonomous Balkan churches began to re-emerge around the end of the 19th- and early 20th-century, including the Orthodox Churches of Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania, and Greece.

The late 20th-century collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the freer public role played by religion in those territories, as well as new missionary endeavors, has driven the Ecumenical Patriarchate into a role similar to earlier centuries. Today, its ecumenical character is understood more as a function—coordinating pan-Orthodox assemblies, as an Orthodox arbiter and authority in areas where no other Orthodox churches have jurisdiction, and in being primus inter pares (“first among equals”).

Since his election, His All Holiness Patriarch Bartholomew has called a transnational synod of all of the bishops under his jurisdiction every two
years; this is one way in which he exercises the ecumenical character of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. He also has a representative office in the European Union, and is well-known for his organization of international meetings about ecological problems, which have focused attention on the environment and, in the process, cemented his own position as an Orthodox leader. After he was elected patriarch, he publicly supported Turkey’s E.U. membership as a way to assure the future of both the patriarchate and the Greek community in Turkey, although this has caused disputes with Greece, whose foreign policy opposes Turkish membership in the European Union.

RTE: How does the average Turkish citizen view the presence of this transnational Ecumenical Patriarchate on Turkish territory?

DR. MACAR: Public opinion in Turkey regarding the patriarchate is basically divided. One side insists that the patriarchate’s ecumenical character is not an issue, and this group consists of left-wing and right-wing liberals and a few retired diplomats, who themselves have two approaches. The first says that the patriarchate’s ecumenical character is not a factor in its relations with the Turkish state. The other approach suggests that because of its ecumenical character, the patriarchate might be useful in international politics, such as the patriarch’s support of Turkey’s bid for E.U. membership. Also, in the last Balkan war, Turkey hoped to influence the patriarch to put pressure on Serbia, via the Serbian patriarchate, to stop the war. The government did not succeed in this, however.

The public faction opposing the patriarchate are Turkish nationalists who claim that the title “ecumenical” was ended by the Lausanne Treaty and that such a transnational title can no longer be used. According to them the title “Ecumenical Patriarch” implies his being above and outside the laws of Turkey, and not recognizing the sovereignty of the republic over its citizens. This was the official position of the Turkish state throughout the 20th century as well.

RTE: How would you compare the Truman-era interest in the patriarchate with what is going on now between the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the U.S., and Turkey?

DR. MACAR: The post-1945 and post-1989 periods can be considered very similar in terms of the position of the Orthodox Church in international relations. Efforts to have the Russian Church play an international role as part
of the USSR, and later as part of the Russian Federation, were mirrored in both periods by the U.S., which hoped to use the Ecumenical Patriarchate as an organ of defense and expansion. I don’t mean this literally as territorial expansion, but as a metaphor for political influence.

RTE: As an aside, Russia now faces a problem similar to Turkey’s in identifying itself as a secular federation, particularly because the Duma hasn’t yet constitutionally defined the meaning of secular. Although people in the West assume that the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian state are tightly linked, in fact, there is no institutional mechanism by which the state can influence internal Russian church policy, or by which the church can influence state policy or the direction of politics. Any contact between state and church officials is on a purely personal level, and this makes practical cooperation between the government and the church very difficult, even in charitable and philanthropic endeavors.9

DR. MACAR: Yes. The problem of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which for years seemed to be a bilateral issue between Turkey and Greece, has now become an element of U.S.-Turkish relations. For the patriarchate itself, it makes sense to have the U.S. as an international protector instead of Greece. Because historical and contemporary issues between Greece and Turkey are obstacles to Greece’s filling the role of guardian of the patriarchate, the U.S. has taken up that role, and it is even more advantageous for the patriarchate to have the protection of “the most powerful state in the world.” Further, the U.S. has never had the nationalistic hopes that Greece has historically had of reclaiming Asia Minor. On the other hand, it is a success for Greek foreign policy to have shifted the issue of the patriarchate from the bilateral context of Turkey-Greece relations to that of the E.U.-Turkey and U.S.-Turkey axis.

RTE: It is interesting to note that Patriarch Bartholomew has visited America seven times since his elevation as patriarch. According to the Ecumenical

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9 See “The Orthodox Church and Society: Contemporary Church-State Relations in Contemporary Russia, Part II”, Road to Emmaus, Spring 2009, (#37). Access at: http://www.roadtoemmaus.net/back_issue_articles/RTE_37/The_Orthodox_Church_and_Society.pdf
Patriarchate website, on His All Holiness’ last visit in 2009 he had private meetings with President Obama and former President Bill Clinton. State dinners were given in his honor by Vice-President Joe Biden at his home and by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the State Department; further, a joint House and Senate luncheon was hosted for him by Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid at the Capitol. Also, the vice-president visited the patriarch in Istanbul in December, 2011.¹⁰

The “Turkish Orthodox Church”

RTE: To change the subject a bit, those of us who have visited Istanbul sometimes see churches with plaques identifying the building as the “Turkish Orthodox Church.” What can you tell us about this?

DR. MACAR: This was another interesting development in the Republican era. Soon after World War I, a disaffected Orthodox priest, Papa Eftim Karahisaridis of Cappadocia, founded the “Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate,” allegedly to oppose the hellenization of Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians. The usefulness of having a second, more nationalistic Turkish church with a Turkish liturgy was quickly noticed by the Turkish Republic, and by a government decree of 1924, Papa Eftim and his family were exempted from the exchange of populations, allowed to settle in Istanbul, and their organization was legally recognized as a church. Eftim settled in the Panagia Church in Galata with the initial support of leaders of the Galata Greek community who were also on poor terms with the patriarchate. He proclaimed the Panagia church as the headquarters of the “Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate” and himself as Patriarch Eftim I. In 1968, after Papa Eftim’s death, his elder son Turgut replaced him as did the second son, Selcuk Erenerol, when Turgut died in 1991. When Selcuk Erenerol died in 2002, he was succeeded by his son, Pasa Erenerol.

From its inception this church lacked a sustainable community because it has never been recognized by any other church, and simply served as a convenient counterbalance for Turkey against the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Nor has it ever fulfilled the minimum conditions that characterize an Orthodox church organization. For example, although bishops should have a theological education, neither Papa Eftim nor his sons attended seminary. While the


Opposite: Side aisle in the Patriarchal Church of St. George.
patriarch of any Orthodox patriarchate must be elected by a Holy Synod of bishops, this has never happened within this church and there is no synod. Another requirement for the Orthodox consecration of a bishop or patriarch is celibacy, but Papa Eftim and his sons have all been married. The Turkish Orthodox Church has been almost completely dysfunctional for decades and has only had a handful of adherents.

Halki Seminary, the Declining Greek Minority, and Defining Secularism

RTE: Thank you. Dr. Macar, what are the challenges facing the Ecumenical Patriarchate today?

DR. MACAR: Today the patriarchate has two critical difficulties. The first is that the Greek community is on the verge of vanishing. After the Lausanne Treaty, the Greek minority in Turkey had four successive waves of emigration in 1922-29, 1955-59, 1964-68 and 1974-79. The Greek population of Turkey, which was estimated at 110,000 after the exchange of populations in 1923, is today less than 5,000. This Greek Orthodox population needs to be kept in Turkey.

The second difficulty is reopening Halki Seminary, which the patriarchate needs in order to train new deacons, priests and bishops. This issue should be considered “vital,” as the patriarchate requires clerics in order to maintain its ecumenical character and to meet its pastoral and ecclesiastical responsibilities both at the Phanar and in its dioceses and missions abroad.

RTE: What steps have been taken to reopen the seminary?

DR. MACAR: For several years there has been a Turkish commission made up of representatives of several government ministries that has worked on reopening the school, but they face huge problems. Not only will they have to change the law on the foundation and administration of private minority schools in Turkey, but they also have to change Turkey’s constitution. The commission is looking for a formula to reopen Halki, but its problem is the structure of the secular state. If they reopen Halki and the Muslims then ask to open private Muslim schools, what will they answer? The closing of the school was an action against Greece and the Greeks, but reopening the school is no longer a problem of its being Greek. There is widespread discus-
sion in Turkey now about the term “secularism” and how this government understands it.11

RTE: Are there any positive developments in Turkish state-patriarchal relations that you can point to?

DR. MACAR: This year there were two important developments. First, the government has changed older laws and is now giving back properties that were confiscated from the non-Muslim minority foundations. Second, and more importantly, the government has naturalized thirteen of the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s metropolitans, that is, given them Turkish citizenship. This means that the prospective number of candidates for the next patriarchal election has doubled.

RTE: That is welcome news. For the Greek Orthodox community, presumably, the return of properties would include both patriarchal and private holdings. I understand that the former Prinkipo orphanage—which, by the way, is the largest wooden structure in Europe and second largest in the world—has already been given back, and that it is being restored as the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s international environmental center. I also understand that Patriarch Bartholomew has been allowed to do some public liturgies outside of Constantinople, such as in Lycia in St. Nicholas’ birthplace and at the old Soumela Monastery near Trebizond. How has this come about and what do you think it means for the future of Orthodoxy in Turkey?

DR. MACAR: The government that came to power ten years ago has a different policy towards non-Muslim communities than did previous governments. First, because the Republican period was a time of decline and suppression of all Turkish religious groups, the present government ideologically and historically favors the Ottoman model of millets, where each minority was a self-regulating community. They are saying, “This was a golden age for us and for non-Muslim communities. We share a common history, and we will give them back their rights.”

RTE: Before we continue, most of our Orthodox readers think of the Ottoman centuries not as a golden age, but as a long period of suffering: the

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new-martyrs; the 15th- and 16th-century *devşirme* “levy of children,” when boys were drafted from conquered Balkan Christian families, converted to Islam and trained as Janissaries; the confiscation of churches; the prohibition against Christians building or repairing churches, and so on; not to mention atrocities against Armenians, Assyrian, and Greek minorities. As an historian, how do you see this?

DR. MACAR: Historically, this “golden age” discourse is quite problematic. It might have been a “golden age” for Muslims, but of course, the Ottoman Empire was by definition not a democratic state. It had a hierarchial socio-political form in which Muslims were first-class subjects, while non-Muslims were second-class.

Currently, another reason for allowing a certain relaxation in the expression of religion is that there is opposition to the present government by the old-guard Republican Kemalists, and this government needs the support of both the United States and the European Union. Also, the present government is made up of groups that had little influence in the Republican period. In order to gain new voters they will have to give religious rights: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, and so on. There are many factors to explain this change in policy.

RTE: Would you then say that Turkey’s Republican period is over?

DR. MACAR: No, but it is changing. No one wants to go back to having a sultan, but everyone wants to redefine the main principles of the republic. For example, what does it mean to be a Turk? Is this an ethnic category or is it related only to citizenship? Most importantly, what is the meaning of secularism? Does being secular mean forbidding all public expression of religion, or can we redefine the term based on freedom? Now we are in this period of reinvestigation where no one openly says, “I’m against secularism,” but rather, “Secularism is a good thing, but not this practice.”

RTE: I wonder if a parallel could be drawn with our American concept of the separation of church and state? There is a minority of nonreligious Americans who would like to prohibit religious expression in public, and a majority who want the principle to reflect an equality of treatment, not to deny religious expression.

*Opposite: Side aisle, Church of Hagia Sophia, Istanbul.*
DR. MACAR: Turkish liberals, including myself, feel that the government should be the same distance from all denominations, and treat them all equally. The present government doesn’t say this yet, and we are waiting to see what they will do. Today, they need the help of the liberals, and that is why they speak as liberals now. It isn’t clear yet what they believe.

The Church of Hagia Sophia

RTE: Can you tell us now about the status of the Church of Hagia Sophia? What was Turkey’s motive in allowing the 20th-century restoration and display of Byzantine frescoes and mosaics, and why would they want to promote Hagia Sophia even as a museum? Is it simply the universal love of good art?

DR. MACAR: The icons, of course, were covered centuries ago when Hagia Sophia was first converted to a mosque because Islam forbids the depiction of the human face. Because they weren’t defaced, but simply plastered over, the icons were preserved. I think that there are many answers as to why the secular republic turned Hagia Sophia into a museum in 1935. In the 1950’s a discussion was begun by rightist Muslim groups to reopen Hagia Sophia as a mosque, but this discussion is over. Now, everyone accepts that it was a good idea to convert this building into a museum. The Orthodox Christians want it as a church, Muslims want it as a mosque; it’s impossible to give it to one group or to the other, so this is a good solution. From the beginning, the Ministry of Culture called in Byzantine specialists to help with the restoration, and the condition of Hagia Sophia is no longer solely the government’s concern. There are community groups in Turkey made up of both secular and religious members who keep watch over Hagia Sophia, and if the government were to do something wrong there would be petitions and protest.

RTE: When I was last in Hagia Sophia I was told that the huge Islamic medallions with Arabic script affixed to the pillars would have been taken out, but that they are too large to fit through the door.12 Nor can they be broken up because they are historical artifacts.

DR. MACAR: I’ve heard the same, and I think it’s probably true.

12 The 19th-century Islamic medallions in Hagia Sophia (see cover) are inscribed in Arabic script with the names Allah, Muhammed, the first four Islamic caliphs—Abu Bakr, Omar, Osman and Ali— and Muhammed’s grandsons, Hasan and Husayn.
RTE: May we ask about your personal relationship with Patriarch Bartholomew?

DR. MACAR: Yes. The patriarch first heard of me when I was a Ph.D. candidate working on a paper about the Ecumenical Patriarchate. He invited me to lunch and from there our relationship began. I often visit him, and if I need a book or article from the patriarchal library, he always helps me. I now know a lot of people in the patriarchate, and of course, for them it is a novelty to have a Turk interested in this subject. At the beginning it was a little difficult for me—everyone asked, “Are you Christian? Are you of Greek origin? Why are you interested in this subject?” But now everyone knows me, and His All Holiness continues to assist me.

RTE: Does he agree with your views on the history of the patriarchate?

DR. MACAR: He has never told me, “Write this,” or “Don’t write this.” Never. For example, I wrote in my Ph.D. that his interest in environmental problems is a political issue and a way for His All Holiness to show his ecumenicity. When we met, he said, “I don’t agree with you. The environment is not a political issue, but a religious issue.” So, we have this kind of open interchange.

RTE: Although you and your wife, Dr. Oya Macar, are first of all historians, do you see yourselves as a voice for Turkish minorities and are you hopeful that your work may improve their status?

DR. MACAR: This is my academic field, and at the same time I believe in human rights and equality in the world. This is why I defend minorities and minority rights. In the 1980’s and 1990’s it was more difficult because members of minority groups could not speak or write openly as they can today; only a few academics like me could do so. Today each minority has its own leaders, attorneys and spokesmen, and they can speak freely.

RTE: That was my next question. Do you feel free as a Turkish academic, or could your opinions cause trouble for you?
DR. MACAR: I’ve chosen this path. A decade ago I sometimes had small problems, such as not being allowed access to certain state archives. At that time the state chose the researchers they wanted to allow in, but today everything is open. Of course, I’m not saying that Turkey is 100% democratic. We have a lot of problems, but we are no longer the Turkey of the 1990’s. This is obvious.

RTE: Periods of political openness tend to challenge previous ways of thinking. How do contemporary Turkish historians view what many call the “Armenian genocide”?

DR. MACAR: Now we have Turkish historians who defend the term “genocide” for the acts of 1915 against the Armenians. They were strongly pressured in the 1990’s not to say so openly, and some who did were ostracized, but this discussion is alive now in Turkey and the government is saying, “Alright, come, let’s talk. Let’s organize a commission of historians and open the archives.” The new government no longer denies these events. This is good and it is an important step towards solving this problem.

RTE: It also must be a huge problem for the government, because an admission of guilt would open the door, not only to a formal apology to the Armenian people, but to demands for reparations and compensation.

DR. MACAR: Some historians who defend Turkey are saying that the Armenian aim in pressuring international parliaments such as France and the U.S. to recognize the 1915 events as genocide is not just to set the record straight as a matter of justice, but that their primary motive is to obtain territorial and monetary compensation.

RTE: It’s unquestionably a thorny topic. Now, may I ask about your academic background and what other projects you and your wife have worked on?

DR. MACAR: My Ph.D. was on the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Republican period, which covered the years 1923–2000. Afterwards I became interested

*Opposite: Church of St. George, Patriarchate of Constantinople.*
in related subjects and wrote a book on the Greek and Bulgarian Catholics of the Byzantine Rite. This is a unique work because Istanbul was one of the last and latest instances of uniate establishment by Rome, and the story is particularly interesting because the converts were ethnic Greeks of Constantinople who became Byzantine Rite Catholics under the Ottomans.

RTE: When did that happen, and how many converts were there?

DR. MACAR: In the second half of the 19th century, the papacy instructed Catholic missionary congregations in Asia Minor and the Balkans to allow Eastern Orthodox who accepted the primacy of the pope to keep their Byzantine rites, customs, and languages instead of converting to the Latin rite. In Turkey, more Armenians converted than Greeks, but the Greek converts numbered between 1,000 and 1,500.

I’ve also written a number of papers on the history of minority rights in Turkey and I’ve worked in the Greek Foreign Ministry archives on humanitarian aid given by Turkey to Nazi-occupied Greece during World War II. There was large-scale famine in Greece when the British blockaded Greek ports to prevent the Nazis from obtaining arms or supplies by sea. Greek-Americans got around the blockade by finding ways to buy food from Turkey, who transported it to Greece. At the same time, a public campaign began in the Turkish press to send aid to “our friends in Greece.”

After Oya and I married, we wrote a book together about the White Russian Army that came to Turkey after its defeat by the Bolsheviks. In this work we used Turkish, Greek, Russian, English, and French sources. Although when we began we knew that some Russian troops had retreated to Turkey in 1920, we didn’t know that it was the entire Crimean White Army—over 70,000 troops under General Wrangel. They were settled in Gallipoli, and then besieged with offers: Ataturk asked them for help against the Greeks; the French, who had large-scale investments in Tsarist Russia, offered to help them fight against the Bolsheviks; and the British didn’t want any of this to happen, because they wanted Russia to quickly stabilize so that they could resume trade. Most of the White Army troops settled in Serbia, others went to Bulgaria, and after the war some were repatriated to Russia by the League of Nations where they were hung as traitors and agents of the West by the Bolsheviks.

Here in Boston, Oya and I are researching 19th- and early 20th-century Protestant missionary activity in Asia Minor. With the establishment of the secular republic the Protestants lost both their properties and permission
to proselytize, and now have only a few private schools left. I’m focusing on Protestant missionary activities among the Greeks, and Oya, whose specialty is the history of medicine, will write on the medical work of these Protestant missionaries who opened hospitals and clinics in Asia Minor as part of their proselytization.

Beyond Borders: Territory-Based Relations

RTE: At the beginning of the interview you mentioned the need for a territory-based study of history. Do you see historians of different nationalities coming together now to make this happen?

DR. MACAR: Absolutely. For example, I know of a commission organized by the Turkish and Greek governments to jointly rewrite history textbooks – that is, to make a common textbook. Germany and France have already done this, but for the Balkan states it is still a little early. Nevertheless, for the past decade both Turkey and Greece have worked to remove prejudicial and derogatory terms from existing textbooks. We don’t have a common textbook in use, but we have some good samples, one of which is a history book of the Balkans by a commission of Turkish, Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian historians, which can be seen online.13

RTE: I imagine that the personal pain of those who suffered in the twentieth century is still too present to allow the use of a common history.

DR. MACAR: Of course. Historians everywhere in the Balkans are now trying to write more objective history, but governments continue to control textbooks because textbooks are not only history: they present who we are today. A history textbook is a book of citizenship, it’s an ideological book and a religious book. It is what we use to train our young people and we want to put all of our beliefs and ideologies into it. This is not a good thing for historiography, but we all do this. I am very optimistic, though.

RTE: Our Greek journalist friend, George Alexandrou, who has written for Road to Emmaus, says that Turkish and Greek journalists have also become closer, as have other Balkan correspondents.

13 This sample co-operative Balkan textbook can be accessed online at: http://www.cdsee.org/pdf/workbook2_eng_ed2.pdf
DR. MACAR: I lived in Athens for two years doing research. Whenever someone learned that I was a Turk they would immediately say, “Look, my neighbor, we have no problems between us. It is only the politicians who do these things.” I understand that the older generations lived through many bad periods. Both the Greeks in Asia Minor and the Muslims in Balkan states lost their relatives and their properties. Now the third generation after these events has begun to look to the past. “Who am I? Where was my grandfather born?” We have a lot of heritage tourism now in Turkey. Every year, Turks whose parents and grandparents came from Greece during the exchange of populations organize bus trips back to Greece to see their family’s villages.

RTE: Yes, I’ve seen the same thing around Cappadocia, where Greeks come every summer to their ancestral villages. Many people know the houses their grandparents and great-grandparents lived in, and they visit or even stay with these Turkish families.

DR. MACAR: It is the same in Greece where the new villagers invite the old ones from Turkey back into their homes. They have good relations. Everyone knows each other now and because of this they will not fight again.

RTE: The older Greek people I know often tell warm stories of their own, or of their parents’ Turkish neighbors. They make a point that these catastrophes were not the fault of the Turkish people they lived with, but of political forces from outside.

DR. MACAR: That is why we cannot talk in general about “Turks” or “Greeks”. The “Turks” did this; the “Greeks” did that. It is impossible. Certainly, each event had people who were responsible—one, two or five hundred—but never was it all the Turks or all the Greeks. Just as there were certain people responsible for the Armenian atrocities (and we now know who did many of these things), at the same time, there were Turks who defended Armenians against the Turkish officials or the gangs. We have these stories, too.

RTE: When Greek Pontians died in the forced marches of the early twentieth century, some Turkish families took in Greek orphans and raised them to adulthood. I’ve met older Greeks who’ve told me, “Oh, my aunt or my cousin wouldn’t be alive today if a Turkish family hadn’t taken them in.” I’m sure there was similar charity among the Greeks.
DR. MACAR: There is a wonderful book about this in Greek and Turkish, perhaps in English also, called *Tamama* by George Andreadis from Thessalonica.

RTE: Yes. Mr. Andreadis did two long interviews for *Road to Emmaus* on his crypto-Christian ancestors and the period covered by the story of *Tamama*\(^{14}\). There is also a marvelous book on the Orthodox and Muslim experience of the 1923 exchange of populations by Bruce Clark, the international security editor for *The Economist*, entitled *Twice a Stranger: How Mass Expulsion Forged Modern Greece and Turkey*\(^{15}\).

DR. MACAR: This is why, for me, the term “nation” is nonsense. I know Pontian Greeks and I know Pontian Turks, and they themselves will tell you how close they are. On the internet now, people are looking beyond their national borders. We all want to know people who are like us—whether they are American, Turkish, or Greek, we don’t care.

RTE: What would you like to say in conclusion?

DR. MACAR: It has been a great experience for my wife and myself to stay for these months at a Greek Orthodox theological school. We’ve met many different people, we’ve learned a lot, and we have new friendships. We are very happy. It’s a sign of change.

